Final Summarised Response to Critique

I shall share a bit of my personal experiences here (something that I try to refrain from doing, and rightly so), mainly invoked by HUICHIEH's and Olorin's assertation that perhaps there is a bit of 'personal issues' involved.

For reasons of security (and my own peace of mind), it is not possible for me to divulge my unit nor my rank. I do have a personal take on the SAF and for good reason. I won't go so far that I would go to the extent of betrayal or for that matter even 'chao keng' (I am PES A and have no intention of downgrading just for the sake of it). What happened during those days are over, and I do not wish to elaborate what happened as it is no longer consequential. All I will maintain is that while I proposed 'The 3 Mentalities', the irony is that for a good part of my army life I actually did not fall into any 'The 3 Mentalities', though I exited it with a Type 2 mentality, because I realised that there was no viable alternative other than the 3 Mentalities that I just proposed. HUICHIEH states that I generalise Type 2s without consideration for the fact that certain Type 2s 'could question (internally) all the time while recognizing there are inherent limits to what can and cannot be done or be changed in the short run.' I still maintain that such 'internal questioning' is still considered Type 2, unless one explicitly questioning the reasons during that time, which is tantamount to questioning a superior's command, which is not prudent as it may end one up in serious trouble (which I learnt). I would elaborate more but in the spirit of national security I feel it is not prudent to publish such facts in such an open environment.

What I can say is that it left me was a feeling of disillusionment, resentment, frustration, disappointment and betrayal (probably more extreme than most people, I hasten to add). Just as Olorin recognises the positive attitudes that many conscripts and reservists take, with himself as one good example, what I have taken notice is that there is a good number of people who can otherwise contribute so much to Singapore who feel negatively, with myself as one good example. And to make it clear it is not SAF but conscription that is the issue (whereas HUICHIEH focuses mainly on SAF's capabilities in general), although of course SAF and conscription are inextricably linked.

These 'negative' people, intolerant of such 'BS' (again, i qualify that what is BS to some may be Gold to others) may choose an escape route, migration. Quitter, whiner? No point stigmatising them. No matter how righteous souls feel that such people are detestable, many of these people are people we need because there is an evident lack of talent in Singapore. They may not be cut out for military life but it may be a totally different matter in Singapore civilian society. We need talent, we do not need to scare them away. Just as we are attracting foreign talent, we should not scare away our local talent.

I am not stating that SAF or conscription is absolutely useless. What I am saying is that there is a possibility that its importance may be overrated, and/or disproportionate to the sacrifices we make as a result of conscription. Definitely, there will be a risk, a trade off. But we are already risking disillusioning our talents who may be inclined not to stay on in Singapore and contribute to the economy. The trade-off for having conscription could be more costly than beneficial, both individually and collectively. Even if the qualification that the importance of conscription is overrated is rebuttable, it is not an automatic result that the scales will tilt back toward conscription's benefits rather than conscription costs. Where exactly does the scale lie? I cannot say for sure, but I offer a suggestion that perhaps it could way more in favour of Costs rather than Benefits.

Another issue I feel the need to address is the concept of 'security', and the expectation for me to offer 'revolutionary alternatives' to conscription. While the manner of my writing was perhaps suggestory I have repeatedly qualified in my statements that I am focusing on the 'perils' of conscription. The 'alternatives' I suggest are actually suggestions of lessening or eliminating the need for a conscripted force. Note that I encompass a wider definition of 'security' than that of pure military strength alone. Imho, economic, poltical and social circumstances play a big part in security as well. As HUICHIEH pointed out in one the earlier sections of his critique, social awareness of our defense situation indeed contributes to national security as well.

Let me give an analogy by way of a household. If there were people in the house, intruders would be deterred. Therefore it would be prudent to have people in the house (military force). Someone could choose to stay at home (volunteer). If no one wants to stay at home, then some will have to be grounded (conscription). A security alarm could be installed (technology). Or we could hire a security guard (mercenary). These are the military aspects of security.

Now, no doubt, if the house was located in a safe neighbourhood, we would similarly feel more secure (surrounding circumstances). If we did not depend on our neigbour for our groceries, we will feel more secure (self sustenance). If we did not continually pick petty quarrels with our neighbour, we would also feel that much more secure (diplomacy). These are non military aspects of security (there are more which I did not cover).

Gist of the 5 posts

Conscription has its benefits for the individual and the society. However, one cannot neglect to recognise that the costs for the individual and for collective society may weigh more than the benefits.

The essence of the posts were to weigh up the costs, and weigh down the benefits of conscription.

Most of the 'Counter-Critique' and 'Counter-Counter-Critique' can be found here.